Abstract. The SPEKE protocol is commonly considered one of the classic Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) schemes. It has been included in international standards (particularly, ISO/IEC 11770-4 and IEEE 1363.2) and deployed in commercial products (e.g., Blackberry). We observe that the original SPEKE specification is subtly different from those defined in the ISO/IEC 11770-4 and IEEE 1363.2 standards. We show that those differences have critical security implications by presenting two new attacks on SPEKE: an impersonation attack and a keymalleability attack. The first attack allows an attacker to impersonate a user without knowing the password by engaging in two parallel sessions with the victim. The second attack allows an attacker to manipulate the session key established between two honest users without being detected. Both attacks are applicable to the original SPEKE scheme, and are only partially addressed in the ISO/IEC 11770-4 and IEEE 1363.2 standards. We highlight deficiencies in both standards and suggest concrete changes.
Introduction
Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) is a protocol that aims to establish a secure communication channel between two remote parties based on a shared low-entropy password without relying on any external trusted parties. Since the seminal work by Belloven and Merrit in 1992 [2] , many PAKE protocols have been proposed, and some have been standardised [10, 11] .
The Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE) protocol is one of the most well-known PAKE solutions. It was originally designed by Jablon in 1996 [7] . Although some concerns have been raised [8, 9] [5] .
In this paper, we revisit the original SPEKE protocol and review its specifications in the two standardisation documents: IEEE P1363.2 and ISO/IEC 11770-4. We observe that the original protocol is subtly different from those defined in the standards. The reason for the difference, or deviation from the original specification, is not justified clearly in the standards.
During this investigation, we have identified several issues with SPEKE that have not been reported before. Our findings are summarised below:
1. We show that the original SPEKE protocol is subject to an impersonation attack when the victim is engaged in two parallel sessions with an active attacker. The attacker is able to achieve mutual authentication in both sessions without knowing the password. 2. We show that the original SPEKE protocol is subject to a key-malleability attack. The attacker, sitting in between two honest users, is able to manipulate the session key without being detected. 3. While both attacks clearly succeed against the original SPEKE protocol, we show they are partially addressed in IEEE P1363.2 and ISO/IEC 11770-4, but not in any rigorous manner. We propose explicit and concrete changes to both standards.
Details of our findings are explained in the following sections.
The Original SPEKE Scheme
First, we define the original SPEKE scheme based on Jablon's 1996 paper [7] . Let p be a safe prime, p = 2q + 1 where q is also a prime. Assume two remote parties, Alice and Bob, share a common password s. SPEKE defines a function f (·) to map a password s to a group element: f (s) = s 2 mod p. We use g to denote the result returned from f (s), i.e., g = f (s). The SPEKE protocol provides implicit authentication in one round, which is defined below. (Unless stated otherwise, all modular operations are performed modulo p, hence the explicit mod p is omitted for simplicity.) (H(κ) ) and the other party replies with H(κ). The paper does not specify who must initiate the key confirmation and hence leaves it as a free choice for specific applications to decide.
SPEKE (one round

